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abstract This paper focuses on a type of firms that have been traditionally neglected in
both family business and governance research, namely, family-controlled, publicly-listed firms.
Although principal–agent conflicts may be less prevalent in such firms, family control can
potentially give rise to principal–principal conflicts, leading to expropriation of the wealth of
minority owners by family owners. Superior firm performance and the willingness to distribute
the profits through dividend payments would suggest the absence of such expropriation. Based
on a sample of 210 OTC firms in Japan, we examined the relationships between family
control and dividend payouts and profitability. Our results indicate that family control was
positively related to dividend payouts. Further, we found that while foreign ownership
interacted with family control to reduce dividend payouts and increase profitability, bank
ownership did not have such an effect.
INTRODUCTION
A basic assumption in research in the corporate governance area is that public corpo-
rations are characterized by a clear separation between management and ownership. If
a firm is fully owned by a family, however, there is typically no separation between
ownership and control and hence it is assumed that there are no agency problems.
Somewhere between the public firm controlled by professional managers with dispersed
shareholders on the one hand and the privately held firm where a founding family or
group of investors own all the shares on the other hand, lies a widely prevalent but little
researched category of firms, namely, firms that are publicly listed but substantially
owned and controlled by a founding family (Burkart et al., 2003). Filatotchev et al. (2005,
p. 257) point out that there is a dearth of research on ‘family-controlled but publicly listed
firms, which represent a significant part of the corporate sector’. Similarly, Daily et al.
(2003, p. 155) suggest that ‘agency effects may function differently in this context and that
prior findings from non-family samples may not readily generalize into this setting’. One
of the reasons for this is that public listing leads to the presence of diverse shareholder
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groups whose interests tend to vary (Hoskisson et al., 2002). In publicly-listed family-
controlled firms, this ownership heterogeneity presents unique problems that we do not
see in privately-held family firms or non-family-controlled publicly-listed firms, because
the interests of family owners often conflict with those of other shareholders. The
governance of these family-controlled publicly-listed firms constitutes the focus of our
analysis.
Chrisman et al. (2004) argue that the relative agency costs in family and non-family
firms are determined by four conditions: (1) asymmetric altruism; (2) separation of
ownership and management; (3) conflicting interests between owners and lenders; and (4)
conflicting interests between dominant and minority owners. As our focus is on publicly-
listed, family-controlled firms, the last condition is particularly pertinent (Corbetta and
Salvato, 2004). The problems that arise from conflicts between dominant owners such as
family owners and other owners are generally referred to as principal–principal conflicts
(Young et al., 2008). Large family owners may engage in activities that are in their best
interest but not necessarily in the best interests of other shareholders who may not have
any voice in the governance of the corporation and only limited formal or informal
means to protect their interests. There are a variety of means available to family owners
to expropriate the wealth of minority shareholders such as higher pay and perks for
family executives, self-dealing, and investments in other family-owned firms. Hence, the
governance of publicly-listed family-controlled firms is a critical issue for other investors.
Given the potential for principal–principal conflicts in family-controlled firms, our
focus in this article is on empirically assessing the extent to which it actually exists in
family-controlled and publicly-listed over-the-counter (OTC) Japanese firms. Further,
we also investigate the extent to which two powerful groups of principals, namely, banks
and foreign shareholders monitor family owners. The very fact that a family-owned firm
is publicly-listed and has outside shareholders opens up the possibility that the firm is
subject to outside influence. When such outside investors are blockholders, they do have
some capacity to influence managerial decisions and actions, thus reducing the likelihood
of expropriation by family owners. Hence, managerial decision-making in publicly-listed
and family-controlled firms is a theoretically important topic in the area of family
business research. We focus on profitability and dividend payouts as our outcome
variables, because together they address both the issues of wealth generation and wealth
distribution, respectively. If family ownership leads to higher profits and dividends,
clearly the family owners are acting as good stewards and there is no principal–principal
problem. On the other hand, if family ownership leads to either lower profits or lower
dividends, there indeed may be a principal–principal problem and it becomes important
to investigate whether the presence of outside blockholders can mitigate this problem.
This article aims to make several theoretical contributions. First, our study applies the
principal–principal perspective to investigate the monitoring role of non-family owners
in the family-controlled firms. Previous studies that empirically examine the effects of
ownership heterogeneity on firm strategy and performance (e.g. Hoskisson et al., 2002;
Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000) mostly focus on large firms and seldom pay explicit
attention to potential divergence in the interests of different classes of principals in
family-controlled firms. Second, most previous studies have focused on the generation of
wealth by family-controlled firms by examining the relationship between family control
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and profitability (e.g. Filatotchev et al., 2005). We aim to contribute to this stream of
research by examining both the generation of wealth and its distribution by investigating
the effects of family control and ownership monitoring on dividend payment.
THEORY AND RESEARCH CONTEXT
Theoretical Perspectives on Family-Owned Businesses
The publicly-held firm with dispersed ownership and control in the hands of professional
managers is by and large assumed to be the modal form to carry out economic activity
in capitalist economies. The prevalence of this archetype, although common in the
United States and in the United Kingdom, is not representative of corporations in other
parts of the world. Most of the developing economies in South America, and countries
like India and Korea, are dominated by family-owned firms, often forming business
groups that directly own several unrelated firms (Carney and Gedajlovic, 2002; Classens
et al., 2000). Similarly, Faccio and Lang (2002) found that nearly half the firms in
Western Europe are actually family controlled. Even in the United States, although
family control of large public corporations is uncommon, a number of firms, ranging
from Ford Motor Company to Wal-Mart, have significant founding family ownership
stake and many are controlled by members of founding families. Two questions related
to the governance of family firms have attracted considerable interest in recent years.
First, are agency costs prevalent in family firms despite the coupling of ownership and
control? Second, are there conflicts between the interests of family owners and non-
family owners and what mechanisms can mitigate such conflicts?
The widely held agency view that family firms incur no agency costs due to the
governance advantages of concentrated ownership (Amihud and Lev, 1999) and owner
management (Denis and Sarin, 1999) has been challenged in recent years by authors
such as Schulze and Lubatkin, and their colleagues (Lubatkin et al., 2007; Schulze et al.,
2001, 2002, 2003). They argue that the agency approach, although theoretically elegant
and parsimonious, ‘offers an arid and superficial portrayal’ of family firm governance
(Gedajlovic et al., 2004, p. 901), because of its underspecification of what the organiza-
tion and their actors are about. Drawing from work on the behavioural economics of
families (Becker, 1981), these authors argue that family firms are subject to the ‘Samari-
tan’s dilemma’ as well as self-control problems. According to them, family firms, even
those that are privately held and fully owned by a family, can still suffer from agency
problems because of parental altruism (Samaritan’s dilemma). A self-control problem is
essentially ‘agency problems with oneself ’ (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981) wherein founders
do as they wish as opposed to what they should. In the case of publicly-held but
family-controlled firms, the existence of non-family shareholders can potentially reduce
moral hazard problems, even without the assumption of self-control on the part of family
owners.
A very different approach to understanding family-controlled firms is provided by
stewardship theorists who argue that family managers will behave in the organization’s
best interest because they subordinate personal goals to family goals, pursue non-
financial goals, and abide by relational contracts that govern family firm behaviour
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(Corbetta and Salvato, 2004). Whether family managers are agents or stewards has been
the subject of several studies (Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Chrisman et al., 2007), and
evidence of agency problems in family firms is reported by Gomez-Mejia et al. (2001)
and Schulze et al. (2001). Family influence, involvement, and control, resulting from
partial ownership of a firm are indeed complex phenomena with both positive and
negative consequences for the organization (Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007).
A feature common to all firms with significant family ownership and effective family
control is the existence of two classes of shareholders, namely, family owners and
non-family owners. While family ownership may minimize principal–agent problems, it
gives rise to principal–principal conflicts. That is, one group of owners may run the
company in their interest, often acting in violation of the interests of another group of
owners. Problems arising from principal–principal conflicts have been attracting increas-
ing research interest in recent years (Young et al., 2008). The principal–principal
problem is especially acute in publicly traded family-controlled firms because such firms
are often subject to the conflicting interests between family owners and other share-
holders (Corbetta and Salvato, 2004), whereas privately-held firms are less likely to have
such problems. We investigate the extent to which principal–principal conflicts exist in
OTC Japanese firms by focusing on dividend payouts and firm performance. Considering
that different groups of shareholders have different expectations about these two outcome
variables, empirical examination of the relationship between ownership structure and
these outcomes is expected to provide insights about the reconciliation of ‘conflicting
voices’ (Hoskisson et al., 2002) within a firm. In this study, ‘family-controlled firms’ refers
to publicly traded, medium-sized firms, in which a family, either through ownership
stake or board positions, and most often both, exercises substantial influence and control.
Ownership Monitoring
In governance research, it is generally assumed that concentration of ownership leads to
better governance because these owners have greater incentive to monitor and control
the managers. Morck and Yeung (2003) argue that while this view may be valid in the
United States, it is by and large incomplete, if not in error, with regard to family-
controlled business firms in other parts of the world. They identify at least three specific
problems that affect the wealth of minority or outside owners. These are referred to as
‘other people’s money’, managerial entrenchment, and tunnelling. The ‘other people’s
money’ problem refers to a situation wherein a family may have effective control over a
firm with very little investment in that firm. Managerial entrenchment refers to decline
in firm value that occurs when managerial ownership rises beyond a point (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997). Tunnelling refers to self-dealing within a family-owned business group,
whereby through non-market prices the controlling family transfers profits to firms
within the group in which they have higher ownership stakes from firms with lower
ownership stakes.
Family-controlled firms may also experience two additional agency problems. First,
because of large ownership by family owners, there is no market for corporate control
and hence the capital market has little ability to discipline family owners. Second, there
may be a significant difference in the risk preferences of family owners and outside
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owners. Outside owners, especially those who seek financial returns, typically have
diversified portfolios and hence would like individual firms to take higher levels of risk.
Family owners, on the other hand, have most of their wealth tied up with the firm and
hence are likely to be more risk averse than such outside owners. Hence, without some
monitoring mechanisms, the interests of outside owners may not be protected in family-
controlled firms.
Research Context
The relationship between a firm and its main bank plays a central role in Japanese
corporate governance (Dore, 2000). In recent years, there has been a gradual erosion of
the main bank’s influence due to direct access to global capital markets by large firms as
well as weakened financial position of the banks in the post-bubble economy (Fukao,
1999; Morck and Yeung, 2006). However, in the case of smaller firms, banks continue to
be influential because it is relatively more difficult for small firms to access capital markets
at home or abroad. Consequently, banks continue to play their traditional monitoring
role when it comes to small- and medium-sized firms. Another change of far-reaching
consequence for Japanese firms is the rise of foreign portfolio ownership. Since these
foreign investors have only arm’s-length relationships with firms in which they invest,
they seek higher investment returns ( Jackson and Moerke, 2005). Several studies have
found a positive association between foreign ownership and firm performance
(Yoshikawa and Phan, 2003). Clearly, the foreign shareholders, especially foreign port-
folio investors, have different performance expectations and investment time horizons
than the relationship investors.
The focus of our research is on medium-sized, family-controlled firms that are publicly
traded. It is important to note that the vast majority of family-controlled firms are
privately held and therefore limitations of data availability constrain our ability to
examine these firms. Also, all family-owned firms are not necessarily actively managed or
controlled by family members. We focus on those firms that are publicly listed and on
whose boards one or more family members serve. This research context presents a
unique opportunity to study some key issues of governance with regard to family firms.
To some extent these firms can be viewed either as ‘threshold firms’ (Gedajlovic et al.,
2004) or firms that are well past the threshold. That is, the very fact that they have
accessed public equity markets suggests that they have made the transition from being
small and privately held, but are not anywhere close to being the archetypal publicly-
held firm of the Anglo-American context with a clear separation between management
and ownership.
HYPOTHESES
Effects of Family Control
There are multiple ways in which family owners can exercise control or exert influence
over publicly-held firms. One mechanism is through board representation. Second, they
can exercise direct control through management. In many family-owned firms, the top
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executive is a family member. Lastly, even without board representation and family
CEO, family owners may be able to influence managerial decisions indirectly through
informal communication with the board and a professional CEO. The focus of our study
is on the first mechanism, namely board representation.
We investigate the potential for principal–principal conflicts in family-controlled firms
by examining two outcome variables, namely dividend payout and firm performance.
High levels of profitability and dividend payout rates, taken together, indicate that family
owners are working to maximize shareholder value through higher profits, and profits,
once generated, are distributed to all shareholders including minority owners. High
levels of profits and dividend payout rates thus suggest the relative absence of principal–
principal conflicts and lower likelihood of expropriation of wealth by family owners.
Family Control and Dividend Payouts
There has been considerable debate among finance researchers regarding dividend
policies of publicly-held firms. One explanation proposed for the payment of dividends
is that it signals future profitability (Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller and Rock, 1985). Typi-
cally, markets respond to dividend increases with higher share prices, thus increasing
shareholder wealth as well. Recent empirical evidence, however, raises questions about
the extent to which current dividend changes accurately predict future profitability
improvements (Benartzi et al., 1997). An alternative explanation is that dividend payouts
address agency problems (Gomes, 2000; Jensen, 1986). That is, excess cash flows that
would be otherwise used for empire building through acquisitions in unrelated areas or
in projects of questionable value are returned to shareholders through dividends, thus
reducing agency problems.
Our discussion so far has addressed the general question of why firms pay dividends
without introducing the distinction between majority and minority shareholders. Divi-
dend payments, being based on the number of shares owned, treat family and non-
family shareholders equally and hence are free from the problem of expropriation.
Therefore, theoretically, non-family owners may have a greater preference for divi-
dends than family owners but a lower capacity to influence the dividend policy of the
firm than family shareholders. There is very little prior empirical work on the relation-
ship between family control and dividend payouts. Carney and Gedajlovic (2002) found
that family ownership and control are positively related to dividend payouts by firms in
Hong Kong. They attributed this preference for higher dividends to the ‘life-raft values’
of the Hong Kong Chinese, stemming from prolonged experience of economic and
political uncertainty.
Despite the possibility of wealth appropriation by other means, there are a number of
arguments that suggest that family control indeed may lead to higher dividend payments.
First, according to one view, family owners may choose to distribute profits through
dividends instead of either retaining or expropriating the same because of the legal
protection that minority shareholders enjoy (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). Second, family
owners may pay dividends to minority shareholders even in the absence of legal protec-
tion as a substitute for legal protection (Easterbrook, 1984). As reputation for treating
minority owners fairly is more valuable in countries where legal protection for minority
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shareholders is weak, establishing a reputation for good treatment of minority share-
holders will enable these firms to access equity markets in the future (La Porta et al.,
2000). Third, in older family firms, the descendants who have only small shareholdings
have a strong preference for dividend payments. Therefore, owners have an incentive to
pay dividends because it increases their income. Fourth, although it can be argued that
family owners can enhance their wealth through capital gains even in the absence of
dividends, in order to enjoy such capital gain, they will have to sell their shareholdings,
which will dilute their control over the firm. Fifth, when shares of family firms are
publicly traded, there are stringent disclosure rules that make expropriation difficult.
Hence, family owners have an incentive to increase dividend payments. Finally, since
family owners can exert their influence through their representatives on the board, the
presence of family directors is expected to have a positive effect on dividend payouts.
Thus, family owners have both the incentive and the ability to pay higher dividends.
Hence:
Hypothesis 1: Family control is positively related to dividend payout ratio.
Monitoring Effects of Other Shareholders on Dividend Payment
Several studies (e.g. Zahra et al., 2000) have tried to capture the different motivations
and influences of large blockholders following a classification suggested by Brickley et al.
(1988). They classify insurance companies, banks, etc. as pressure sensitive investors
because they have business relationships with the firms in which they hold stock and
hence are susceptible to influence by managers. Pressure-resistant institutions, on the
other hand, have no close business ties with the firm in which they invest and include
pension funds, mutual funds, etc. (Hoskisson et al., 2002). Generally, it can be argued
that the presence of pressure-resistant investors leads to a reduction of agency problems
and hence greater profitability and higher dividend payout rates, other things being
equal. As foreign portfolio investors have only arm’s-length relationships with firms in
which they invest, they are clearly pressure-resistant investors.
Bank shareholders in Japan are often treated as ‘stable’ investors who seek long-term
business relationships and stable transaction flows with their client firms (Aoki et al.,
1994). Hence, when they are dealing with large firms with strong financial positions,
they may be pressure-sensitive. However, in the context of our study, we treat bank
shareholders as stable but pressure-resistant for the following reasons. First, our focus
is on small- to medium-sized firms which are much smaller in size than the banks they
deal with and hence limited in their ability to influence the banks. Second, small- and
medium-sized firms depend far more on the banks for future capital needs than their
larger counterparts who have better direct access to equity and debt markets. Finally,
banking relationships in Japan are very long-term in nature and bank monitoring is
often considered as the primary means of monitoring even for large firms, and espe-
cially for smaller firms in Japan. Thus, in the case of small- and medium-sized
firms in the Japanese context, banks play a role similar to that of pressure resistant
investors.
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Bank Ownership and Dividend Payouts
It can theoretically be argued that a bank would prefer its invested firms to which it also
provides loans to preserve cash in order to reduce the default risk. In many cases, since
a bank’s loan exposure is greater than its equity stake in a borrower firm, the bank is
expected to act more as a creditor than as a shareholder (Morck et al., 2000). However,
we argue that banks have an interest in high dividends and the capacity to bring about
that outcome, and hence bank ownership in family-controlled firms may have a positive
impact on dividends for the following reasons. First, past research suggests that bank
ownership mitigates agency problems and dividend payouts constitute a reduction of
agency problems by making less discretionary cash flows available to the family owners.
Second, dividends, as and when paid out, constitute income for banks. Prior research by
Rajan (1992), and more recently by Morck et al. (2000), using a Japanese sample,
indicates that banks have the capacity to extract surpluses from their clients ex-post.
Finally, dividends have the same disciplining property as interest payments on family
owners. Managers feel the pressure to improve firm profitability so that the firm can meet
market expectations of dividend maintenance; failure to meet such expectations may be
punished by the market with lower equity prices. Therefore, the banks would want the
firms to pay dividends.
Banks, in addition to providing credit to their client firms, typically own substantial
shares in these firms in Japan. There is also close information sharing between the banks
and the client firms. Because the firm depends on its bank for future capital needs, it can
be expected that banks will have influence on the decisions of the firms, especially small-
to medium-sized family-controlled firms. Thus, as bank ownership increases, the positive
relationship that we suggested between increasing family control and dividend payouts
will become even stronger, as any tendency towards expropriation will be further sup-
pressed. Hence:
Hypothesis 2: Bank ownership positively moderates the relationship between family
control and dividend payout.
Foreign Ownership and Dividend Payouts
There are two fundamentally different types of owners in publicly-held Japanese firms:
relational investors and market investors (Yoshikawa et al., 2006). Majority of the stock
is typically held by the domestic relational investors such as banks, suppliers, insurance
companies, etc. A new group of market investors in the Japanese financial markets in
recent years has been foreign institutional investors. Research indicates that foreign
investors own relatively small stakes and trade their shares frequently (Davis and Steil,
2001). Because the majority of the shares are held by relational investors who rarely trade
their shares, the active trading by foreign investors has a disproportionate effect on share
prices (David et al., 2006). This is likely to make the family owners responsive to the
expectations of those foreign owners. Then, what would be the expectations of foreign
owners with respect to dividend payments?
At first sight, it may appear that foreign institutional investors would desire high
dividend payouts. Empirical support for a positive relationship between foreign owner-
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ship and dividend payout has been found in the case of Japanese manufacturing firms by
Gedajlovic et al. (2005). While such a relationship may be true in the case of investments
in large firms in relatively mature industries, we argue that foreign investor expectations
may be exactly the opposite in the case of small firms. Foreign investors in Japan, as in
most other countries, are primarily institutional investors. Funds that invest in small- and
medium-sized firms in OTC markets are not seeking dividend growth as an investment
goal. Instead, such funds that invest in smaller firms tend to focus more on capital
appreciation. Foreign investors are undertaking greater risk in investing in a small
family-controlled Japanese firm rather than in one of the big corporations, and hence
expect this higher risk to be rewarded by significant returns. The relative insignificance
of dividends in affecting their overall rate of return makes them less sensitive to the
absolute quantum of dividend payments. Second, compared to other industrialized
economies, dividend payout rates of Japanese firms have been historically lower
(Government of Japan, 2006). Thus, generally speaking, foreign investors seeking
higher dividends are unlikely to consider Japan as an attractive investment location given
that they can benefit from substantially higher dividend payout rates in other parts
of the world.
In addition, foreign institutional investors who have relatively large equity stakes can
also influence decision-making in the boardroom. Although they may not have the
inside-track as domestic institutions do, their investment activities may be closely moni-
tored by family directors, because trading by foreign investors can affect stock prices of
these relatively smaller OTC firms significantly. Recent research by Ahmadjian and
Robbins (2005, p. 458) indicates that ‘Japanese executives . . . were acutely aware of the
proportion of their shares held by foreigners, and were increasingly making decisions
with foreigners in mind’. Thus, it is likely that foreign ownership would suppress the
positive relationship between family control and dividend payout ratio. Therefore:
Hypothesis 3: Foreign ownership negatively moderates the relationship between family
control and dividend payout.
Family Control and Profitability
The relationship between family control and firm performance has been the subject of
vigorous debate in both the finance and management areas. A number of empiri-
cal studies seem to indicate that family-controlled businesses outperform their rivals
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Anderson et al., 2003). From an agency perspective, it is
argued that family owners have strong incentives to improve firm value because their
wealth is closely tied to firm performance. In addition, when family owners also manage
the firm, the interests of shareholders and management are aligned and hence agency
problems are effectivelyminimized. Le Breton-Miller andMiller (2006) andMiller and Le
Breton-Miller (2006) suggest that lengthy tenures and profound business expertise give
family-controlled business owners the discretion, incentive, knowledge, and resources to
invest deeply in the future of the firm. Their long-term horizon is reinforced by their
inclination to pass their firm to next generations to succeed (Casson, 1999). On the other
hand, hired managers, unless they are closely monitored by family owners, may employ
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shorter time horizons in their decisionmaking because both their upwardmobility outside
the firmand financial rewardswithin the firmare typically tied to short-termperformance.
There is an equally strong, if not stronger, argument that family ownership has
detrimental effects on firm performance. These arguments in support of inferior perfor-
mance are based on three fundamental factors: primacy of non-economic goals, avail-
ability of other means to expropriate wealth, and incompetence. First, as Klein and
Kellermanns (2008) point out, family firms do not blindly pursue profits. Instead, non-
economic considerations also affect their behaviours and outcomes. Second, family
owners may have incentives to expropriate wealth from the firm through various means
such as excessive executive compensations to family managers or related-party transac-
tions. Third, family control has a number of competence and motivation related negative
consequences. It has been argued that family-controlled firms may have inferior perfor-
mance due to a dearth of professional management and inadequate access to capital
(Chandler, 1990), nepotism (Schulze et al., 2001), succession decisions based on whims
rather than competence (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004), and scepticism by financial
markets (Claessens et al., 2002). Large family ownership reduces the influence of other
large shareholders on management, thus leading to greater managerial entrenchment
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001). Also, family owners may make it more difficult to replace
family managers even when they are not competent or well qualified to manage the firm
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Further, family ownership may negatively affect employee
motivations and productivity, for example by redistributing rents from employees to
themselves by reducing employee salaries and increasing their own compensations and
perks (Burkart et al., 1997). Hence, although family owners may have economic incen-
tives to enhance firm profitability, either their incompetence or their pursuit to maximize
personal welfare or utility, which is not always purely economic, can lead to sub-optimal
levels of firm performance. Hence:
Hypothesis 4: Family control is negatively related to firm profitability.
Bank Ownership and Profitability
It has also been argued that substantial ownership by banks reduces agency problems in
Japanese firms (Grundfest, 1990; Prowse, 1990). Further, banks have a vested interest in
the survival of the firm because, as lenders, their funds are at risk. In addition, it is in the
interest of the banks to maintain high equity prices because of their equity ownership
position. As debt providers as well as equity owners, banks have a strong incentive to see
that their client firms perform well so that those firms are profitable enough to pay
interests on their loans, pay back the principal amounts when the loans are due, and also
pay dividends. Although there is an argument that banks redistribute profits from more
profitable firms to less profitable ones in keiretsu groups in Japan (Lincoln et al., 1996),
that argument is less applicable for family-controlled medium-sized OTC firms. These
arguments suggest that banks would have a strong interest in a firm’s performance. Since
banks have insider access to corporate information of their client firms, it would be
difficult for managers of those firms to seek personal or corporate interests that are not
consistent with those of banks (Berglof and Perotti, 1994). Hence, banks are able to play
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an effective monitoring role. Such monitoring can weaken the negative relationship
between family control and profitability that we advanced earlier. Hence:
Hypothesis 5: Bank ownership positively moderates the relationship between family
control and profitability.
Foreign Ownership and Profitability
As discussed, the primary motivation of foreign institutional investors is to earn financial
returns. Since these investors have only arm’s-length relationship with firms in which
they invest, they can expect to receive no other benefits from their shareholdings.
Therefore, firms with large foreign ownership are under pressure to improve their
financial performance. Although these foreign investors may own relatively smaller
equity stakes compared to those owned by domestic affiliated shareholders, their fre-
quent trades can have large impacts on their invested firms’ stock prices (David et al.,
2006). Therefore, it is expected that foreign ownership is positively associated with firm
profitability. When foreign fund managers do not exercise the exit option, they are even
more likely to monitor the managers, thereby weakening the negative relationship we
suggested between family control and firm profitability.
Hypothesis 6: Foreign ownership positively moderates the relationship between family
control and profitability.
METHODS
Sample Selection
Japan has four major stock exchanges, the largest being the Tokyo Stock Exchange
(TSE), holding more than 95 per cent of the market value in the country. Companies
interested in listing on TSE can choose to list on either the two main boards – First and
Second Sections – or on the OTC market. Generally speaking, the First Section houses
stocks of larger companies and the Second Section serves the smaller and newly listed
companies. The OTC market sometimes serves as a stepping stone for companies
wanting to list on the main boards but which do not meet the listing requirements.
Compared to firms listed on the First and Second Sections, OTC listed firms are
generally smaller than TSE firms, in terms of both total asset value and mean employ-
ment. Companies listed on the OTC market are quite diverse, but there are a large
number of service-oriented firms represented in this market. In 1999, based on TSE’s
industry classification, service firms accounted for 25.2 per cent of the total market value
of the OTC market, while retail firms accounted for 14.8 per cent and wholesale firms
accounted for 12.3 per cent. Some of these OTC listed smaller firms may be suppliers
(usually second or third tier) to large keiretsu firms, but they are not key members of such
groupings due to their small size.
We believe that OTC listed firms in Japan constitute an ideal sample for testing the
hypotheses in this study. First, in terms of ownership structure, OTC listed firms tend to
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reflect a higher ‘insider’ or managerial ownership than TSE listed firms, and many of
these managers are family members. Second, the mean share of stocks held by the largest
shareholders is also notably higher in OTC firms than in TSE firms.
Our sample firms were selected from the entire population of OTC firms in Japan for
the period from 1998 to 2002. We chose this population because a higher proportion of
firms in this market have family owners/directors compared to the First and Second
Sections of the major stock exchanges, where usually larger firms are listed as noted
earlier. In order to reduce the industry level variances in financial figures, we selected
only manufacturing firms as our sample. After removing firms with missing ownership
data, the final sample size is 210 firms and 1021–1038 firm-year observations (unbal-
anced model). A total of 159 firms (76 percent) in our sample of 210 firms have family
owners. All the data were collected from the Kaisha Shikiho ( Japan Company Handbook).
Variables
Dependent variables. Our study used dividend payout ratio as one of the dependent variables.
This ratio was calculated as the total dividend payments divided by net profits, as this is
the most commonly used measure of dividend payouts (La Porta et al., 2000). The other
dependent variable we used was return on assets (ROA), the most commonly used
performance measure in the literature.
Independent variables. We used the number of family directors on the board as a measure of
family control in our study. In this paper therefore, family-controlled firms are those
firms that have a member (or members) of the largest family shareholder on the board.
We counted the number of directors who have the same family name with the largest
individual shareholder. If there are more than two family names among the top 10
shareholders, we only used the name with the largest individual ownership. Although this
approach is used in other studies (e.g. Filatotchev et al., 2005), our measure may have
underestimated family control as relatives with different family names may also own
large shares. However, as there is no way to verify this from publicly available data, we
chose to use this conservative approach. Further, compared to other contexts such as
Korea and Taiwan, where many people share a relatively small number of last names
(e.g. Kim and Lee in Korea, and Li, Chen, and Chang in Taiwan), the Japanese context
does not present the same problem.
Bank ownership is the sum of shares owned by banks that are among the top 10
shareholders. Foreign ownership is the percentage of shares out of total outstanding shares
owned by foreign investors. Foreign investors in Japanese firms are usually either port-
folio investors such as pension funds or corporations such as Ford and Siemens. Since our
focus is on the effects of foreign investors that seek financial returns rather than strategic
interests, we excluded ownership by foreign corporations.
Control variables. We utilized several controls in our analyses.[1] First, to control for the
effects of firm size, log of total sales (log sales) was included in the model. Equity ratio is the
ratio of total equity capital to total assets. This control was included because smaller
equity capital or larger debt could increase a firm’s interest payment costs and hence
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affect firm performance. At the same time, a high level of debt could function as a
disciplinary mechanism and may have a positive impact on firm performance ( Jensen,
1986). Firm age is the age of each firm. The firm’s age may affect its propensity to pay
dividends as older firms may be more established and hence have less growth opportu-
nities. Firm ownership is the sum of shares owned by non-financial firms that are among the
top 10 shareholders. This category of shareholders usually includes the parent firms and
business partner firms in the Japanese context. If the large corporate owners are the
parent firms, it is likely that their investments are to control operations of their listed
subsidiaries.[2] If they are business partners such as suppliers, their investments are for
strategic purposes, e.g. to ensure stable transaction flows. Since these shareholders are
‘stable’ investors, we expect that they will mitigate the market pressure. According to
prior research, the critical contingency which determines whether a high dividend
payout is appropriate or not is the presence of growth opportunities at the level of the
firm. Hence, to account for growth opportunities, we used sales growth (La Porta et al.,
2000), measured as year to year percentage change in total sales, as a control variable.
Finally, in order to control for the industry effects, we used the industry dummy vari-
ables. In our sample, we have textile, chemicals, ceramics, steel and metal, machinery,
electric, transportations, and other manufacturing industries.[3]
Analysis
We examined the effects of family ownership, family directors, and other ownership
categories on dividend payouts and ROA, using a firm-year unit of analysis. Since
panel-level heteroscedasticity was significant for our estimation models, we adopted a
cross-sectional time series feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) regression model that
provided reliable estimates in the presence of heteroscedasticity (Wooldridge, 2002). To
check the robustness of our findings, we also used random-effects models based on the
Hausman test results and found somewhat weaker but very similar results. Hence, our
findings were consistent with the different specifications. We examined variance inflation
factors (VIFs) and found that multicollinearity was not a significant factor. We lagged all
the independent and control variables by one year in order to enable causal inference.
We further checked the possibility of reverse causality in the relationships between
ownership, especially foreign and bank ownership, and dividend payouts and ROA,
because shareholders may be attracted to firms with higher dividend payouts or profit-
ability. Following Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), we found that the foreign and bank owner-
ships were explained by their lagged values, but not by dividend payouts and ROA of
previous years. This result indicates that the possibility of reverse causality in our model
is unlikely. We also centred the values of the independent variables by subtracting the
means to reduce potential multicollinearity in our tests of interaction effects (Aiken and
West, 1991).
RESULTS
Table I shows the correlations among the variables used in the study. Table II shows the
effects of family director, bank ownership, and foreign ownership on dividend payout
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ratio and ROA. As shown in Model 2 in Table II, we found support for Hypothesis 1.
Our results show that family director is significantly (p = 0.001) and positively related to
dividend payout ratio. Hypotheses 2 and 3 are also supported. We found that while the
interaction of bank ownership and family director is positively related to dividend payout
ratio (p = 0.01), the interaction of foreign ownership and family director is negatively
related to dividend payouts (p = 0.01), as shown in Model 3.
Regarding our results on ROA, Hypothesis 4 is rejected. The results show that the
main effect of family director is not significant in Model 5 and becomes marginally
significant with the interaction variables as shown in Model 6 in Table II. We also tested
the same hypothesis with family ownership and found no significant relationship with
ROA. Thus, our hypothesized negative relationship between family control and profit-
ability is not supported. Regarding the hypothesized interaction effects, Hypothesis 6 is
supported as shown in Model 6, as we found that the interaction of foreign ownership
with family director is positively related to ROA (p = 0.001). But Hypothesis 5 is rejected
as the interaction of bank ownership with family director has no significant effect on
ROA.
To provide further insights on the moderating effects of bank and foreign ownership,
we created a plot which compares the interaction effects of foreign ownership and family
director and that of bank ownership and family director on dividend payouts. As shown
in Figure 1, the interaction of bank ownership and family director has a positive effect on
dividend payouts, whereas the interaction of foreign ownership and family director has
a negative effect. These slopes clearly show that foreign ownership and bank ownership,
through the interaction with family director, have opposite effects on dividend payout
ratio.
Table II. Effects of ownership structure on dividend payouts and ROA
Dividend payouts ROA
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Control
Equity ratio 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.27*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.05***
Sales log 3.61* 0.39 0.83 2.42*** 1.75*** 1.76***
Firm age -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02***
Firm ownership 0.09 0.14* 0.16* 0.02** 0.02** 0.01†
Sales growth 1.12 0.76 0.42 2.14*** 2.08*** 2.10***
Main
Family director (FD) 2.14*** 1.44** 0.05 0.12†
Bank ownership 0.45*** 0.59*** 0.08*** 0.06***
Foreign ownership -0.09 -0.31** 0.04** 0.07***
Interaction
FD * Bank ownership 0.31** -0.01
FD * Foreign ownership -0.24** 0.04***
Wald chi-sq 296.24*** 418.78*** 360.22*** 571.77*** 600.72*** 513.15***
Log likelihood -4,931.80 -4,936.81 -4,934.26 -2,640.68 -2,623.19 -2,628.85
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
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Whether the family owners’ decision to retain cash rather than to pay dividends can
be seen as expropriation of other shareholders is a contentious issue, because a firm with
growth opportunities may choose to retain cash for future growth which benefits share-
holders through capital gain. To examine this issue, we conducted a supplementary
analysis by including an interaction term of family director and sales growth in the FGLS
regression. As in the main analysis, we controlled for industry effects and checked for
multicollinearity to ensure that that is not a problem. The coefficient of this interaction
term was negative and significant (p < 0.01), indicating that when growth opportunities
are present, family directors prefer to retain profits rather than distribute them as
dividends. To gain further insight, we created a plot of this interaction by following Aiken
and West’s approach (1991). For sales growth, we plotted the relationship for three
different levels, namely, mean level of growth (0.05 per cent), high growth (one standard
deviation above the mean, 0.52 per cent), and low growth (one standard deviation below
the mean, -0.42 per cent). The resulting patterns, presented in Figure 2, show that the
propensity to retain profits is present only when sales growth is high. We also examined
the interaction effects of bank ownership as well as foreign ownership and sales growth
and found no significant relations for foreign ownership, but found a weak and positive
relationship for bank ownership (Table III).
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Figure 1. Dividend payout and the interaction effect of family director and ownership
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Figure 2. Dividend payout and the interaction effect of family director and sales growth
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DISCUSSION
The results of this study indicate that family owners prefer high dividend payments in the
OTC firms in Japan. This is indirect evidence that despite the potential for wealth
expropriation by family owners, there is no reason to believe that Japanese family owners
engage in such behaviour. Further, we found no moderating effect of bank ownership on
the relationship between family directors and firm profitability. This suggests that banks,
despite their potential power to influence the firms to which they have extended loans, do
not seem to exercise that power. This may be due to the fact that banks are more
interested in stable earnings, rather than in higher profitability. As long as their interest
payments are not in jeopardy, they seem to have little incentive to take an active interest
in the governance of their client firms. In terms of the moderating effect of foreign
investors on the relationship between family directors and dividend payouts, the opposite
effects from bank ownership were found. These results suggest that foreign investors
typically invest in small- and medium-sized Japanese firms expecting capital appreciation
than dividends. Further, the interaction of foreign ownership and family directors on
firm profitability is positive, meaning that foreign investors influence family directors to
enhance profitability. These results suggest that different types of principals influence
management differently as their interests often diverge.
Our main effects also indicate that concerns about expropriation by family owners
may be misplaced, at least in the context of Japanese small- and medium-sized firms. The
result of our supplementary analysis, which indicates that family owners tend to retain
profits when a firm has high growth opportunities (as shown in Figure 2), supports this
argument. Thus, our results seem to be more consistent with stewardship theory rather
than the perspective that family owners would seek to maximize their payoffs through
expropriation. In addition, the positive interaction effect of bank ownership and sales
Table III. Interaction effect of family control and sales growth on divi-
dend payouts
Dividend payouts
Equity ratio 0.249*** 0.275***
Sales log 1.931 2.181
Firm age 0.024 0.060
Firm ownership -0.052 -0.020
Bank ownership (BO) 0.812*** 0.937***
Foreign ownership (FO) -0.343*** -0.489***
Family directors (FD) 1.515** 2.096***
Sales growth (SG) 3.346 4.410**
BO * SG 0.877†
FO * SG -0.325
FD * SG -4.244**
Wald chi-sq 225.97 287.91
Log likelihood -5,041.83 -5,028.80
Note: Industry controls not reported.
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growth suggests that banks still prefer to receive dividends, possibly as a disciplinary
mechanism. A theoretical implication of these findings is that although there is potential
for conflict of interests among the different types of shareholders, such potential is
mitigated when family owners behave as good stewards of the firm.
This paper makes several additional important theoretical contributions. First, we
show that the principal–principal perspective is an appropriate theoretical framework to
examine the governance effects of divergent shareholders in publicly-listed family-
controlled firms. Based on the principal–principal perspective, our study examines the
unique problems presented by ownership heterogeneity in publicly-listed family-
controlled firms and shows how the divergent objectives among family owners, banks,
and foreign investors are resolved in terms of dividend payment and profitability. The
results of our study also lend evidence to suggest that when there are different classes of
principals, one set of principals may engage in monitoring of other sets of principals. This
principal–principal monitoring indicated by the interaction effects shows that the distri-
bution of ownership matters for family-controlled firms, especially when they are pub-
licly listed, because the presence of large non-family owners actually makes family-
controlled firms want to respond to the expectations of such owners even though there
is no threat to their control. Hence, our study advances research in family-controlled
firms by going beyond simply examining the effects of family control on firm
performance.
Our study also provides theoretical insights on the governance substitution argument
in family-controlled firms (Hoskisson et al., 2002; Rediker and Seth, 1995). Our results
indicate that the moderating effects of banks and foreign owners on dividend payment
are different, although they both promote higher profitability of family-controlled firms
in which they invest. This suggests that banks and foreign investors do not substitute each
other in the case of dividend payment because each group has different investment
objectives. In the case of family-controlled firms, there is the possibility that family
owners may see their interests aligned with some outside shareholder groups and in
conflict with other groups of shareholders. Therefore, instead of a simple dichotomy of
family owners versus other outside owners, it may be more interesting to analyse how
different shareholder groups, including family owners, see their interests – as either
aligned or in conflict with other groups in specific situations.
Limitations
While interpreting the results of this study, it is important to bear in mind some of its
limitations. First, given our choice of OTC listed Japanese firms as our sample, we
cannot assume that the results are generalizable either to large firms in Japan or to small-
and medium-sized firms in other countries, although this issue of limited generalizability
is inherent in any sample set researchers use. As Carney and Gedajlovic (2002, p. 125)
point out, however, restricting the study to one country enables researchers to ‘hold
constant a variety of material contextual considerations’ across the entire sample while
utilizing ‘extant sociological, cultural, and historical accounts’ of that country. Second,
while our study used only dividend payments to measure family owners’ attempts to
extract cash from the firm, there are other ways that these owners can gain private
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benefits, such as excessive compensation to family directors/executives. Third, we have
treated all foreign owners as the same, but in reality there could be very different classes
of foreign owners, such as mutual and pension funds, banks, individual investors, etc.
The composition of foreign owners and distribution of ownership among them can
influence managerial actions and firm outcomes (Filatotchev et al., 2005).
Future Research Directions
We believe that further insights about governance in family-controlled firms can be
gained by extending this study in several additional productive directions. First, although
we used board representation by family members as our independent variable, this by
itself does not indicate whether they are actively involved or not. Second, our study is
confined to publicly-listed firms. The vast majority of family controlled firms are pri-
vately held, which means that researchers have difficulty obtaining meaningful data
about these firms. Another fruitful direction for future inquiry would be comparisons of
the governance of family-controlled firms across different national contexts. The legal,
cultural, and institutional differences across countries may result in differences in investor
preferences and expectations.
CONCLUSION
The results of our study provide additional support to the argument that ownership
structure can have important implications. The reality is more complex and more
nuanced than the simplistic assertion that agency problems disappear in the presence of
ownership concentration or the competing claim that family owners would naturally be
inclined to appropriate the wealth of minority shareholders. Our results suggest that
what is truly important is to theorize on the basis of an understanding of the players in the
interaction as well as the context of the interaction. By analysing the differences in the
motivations of different types of owners and explicitly considering the context (growth
opportunities available to the firm), this study was able to arrive at important insights
about how the interplay of ownership heterogeneity and contextual differences can
impact wealth generation and wealth distribution by publicly-listed firms.
While agency-theoretic tools have proved to be very powerful in the analysis of
principal–agent problems, it is unclear whether they are equally appropriate for analys-
ing principal–principal conflicts. Young et al. (2008) provide a comprehensive and sys-
tematic listing of the differences between principal–agent and principal–principal
conflicts which should serve as a starting point in the development of formal analytical
techniques for the investigation of principal–principal conflicts and their resolution.
Given that ‘family firms are at least as common among public corporations around the
world as are widely held and other nonfamily firms’ (Villalonga and Amit, 2006, p. 2), the
governance of family-controlled firms is an important research issue with managerial and
policy implications.
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NOTES
[1] We had initially included share ownership by family directors and family CEO as controls, but we
removed those variables because they were highly correlated with the number of family directors.
Another possibly important control is family director compensation. Unfortunately, compensation data
are not available for OTC firms.
[2] It is common for large Japanese firms to list their subsidiary firms on the stock exchanges, although this
has been changing gradually in recent years.
[3] We also used the industry average of the dependent variables rather than the industry dummy variables
to control for the industry effects and found similar results.
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